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Democracy Promotion in the Obama Administration: 
An Opportunity to Match Action to Rhetoric 
 
Patrick J. Glen 
 
We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its 
defense.  And for those who seek to advance their aims by 
inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that 
our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken – you cannot outlast us, 
and we will defeat you…. To those who cling to power through 
corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you 
are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if 
you are willing to unclench your fist.1 
President Barack Obama 
Inaugural Address 
January 20, 2009 
 
There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred 
and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward 
the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human 
freedom.  We are led, by events and common sense, to one 
conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly 
depends on the success of liberty in other lands.  The best hope for 
peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world…. 
So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation 
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.2 
President George W. Bush 
Second Inaugural Address 
January 20, 2005 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In the opening months of the Obama Presidency, the new administration, consistent with 
its campaign rhetoric, has distanced itself from the practices and policies of the Bush 
administration in many key and divisive areas, including such disparate initiatives as stem cell 
                                               
1
 Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-speech/ (last visited June 10, 2009). 
2
 George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
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research,3 archiving and release of presidential documents,4 the detention facility at Guantanamo 
Bay,5 interrogation policy,6 policy and planning review within the executive branch,7 foreign aid 
expenditures to organizations that advocate abortion as a facet of family planning,8 and 
continuance of the State Children’s Health Program.9  Without passing judgment on the 
administration’s shift in these areas, and many others, it is worth noting that change is good – so 
long as continuity is not what is needed.  One area where the new administration should take 
note of its predecessor, and continue and build on many of the policies and initiatives advocated 
by the Bush administration, is in the area of democracy promotion and its place within U.S. 
foreign policy.  Although the idea of “democracy promotion” is emerging from the Bush 
administration with a black eye (or two), the concept and practice of democracy promotion is 
itself sound, so long as one can wade through the competing and often groundless critiques 
leveled at the policy.  Moreover, democracy promotion is a multi-faceted instrument that can 
promote a broad array of important foreign policy goals, above and beyond its clearest aim, i.e., 
bringing democracy, broadly understood, to areas where authoritarian rule is still present.  As 
current Vice-President Joseph Biden stated in 2006, “in our struggle against terrorism, and in 
                                               
3
 Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (March 9, 2009), revoking Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 
34,591 (June 20, 2007). 
4
 Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009), revoking Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 
56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001). 
5
 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities”). 
6
 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009), revoking, inter alia, Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007). 
7
 Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Jan. 30, 2009), revoking Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 
(Feb. 26, 2002); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,703 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
8
 Presidential Memorandum, Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4,903 (Jan. 23, 2009), revoking Presidential Memorandum, Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 
17,303 (Mar. 28, 2001); Presidential Memorandum, Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,323 (Aug. 29, 2003). 
9
 Presidential Memorandum, State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,347 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
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promoting security and stability, the [Bush] administration is right: democracy is our most 
powerful weapon.”10 
 Vice-President Biden is not alone in noting the general importance of democracy 
promotion as a tool of foreign policy, or of the specific contributions that the Bush 
administration did make in this area.  Democracy promotion has been embraced by both 
Democrats and Republicans in the name of security, morality, and on account of the myriad 
linkages between divergent interests that currently exist in international law and policy, and 
which can all be served by some aspect of the democracy promotion project.  Thus, former U.S. 
Representative Tom Lantos stated, in 2005, that “[i]t is clear that promoting democracy through 
diplomacy is crucial to our country’s long-term security as well as to the stability of many other 
countries in the world…. the lack of democracy can create safe havens for nihilistic and 
destructive forces that do not value human life.”11  Echoing this sentiment and the statement of 
Biden, Senator Joseph Lieberman has written that “security at home is partly dependent on the 
degree of freedom and democracy in lands abroad…. As we address the challenge of terrorism 
before us, there is little doubt the spread of democracy is our most powerful ally.”12 
 Coupling the threat of terrorism with former President Bush’s turn towards a more realist 
foreign policy made his administration an obvious benefactor of the democracy promotion 
paradigm.  Testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International 
Relations in 2005, then Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky stated: “President Bush and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have made democracy a defining component of our 
Nation’s role in the world.  Advancing freedom has become a hallmark of this administration’s 
                                               
10
 Non-Governmental Organizations and Development of Democracy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden), available at 2006 WLNR 9895993 (2006). 
11
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). 
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 Id. at 7 (statement for the record of Sen. Joseph Lieberman). 
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foreign policy.”13  In a statement one year later, Senator Richard Lugar made a similar 
observation: “Support for democratic, grassroots organizations in many countries around the 
world has become a centerpiece of America’s international outreach.”14  Bush’s focus on 
democracy promotion is certainly a quantitative departure from prior administrations, focusing 
on the resources and appropriations expended in its pursuit, but the administration’s focus was 
also qualitatively distinct as well, a fact rooted in Bush’s own high opinion of the transformative 
potential of democracy promotion.  Drawing this distinction during the course of a 2007 panel 
discussion on democracy promotion, Larry Diamond, a noted democracy scholar and political 
science professor at Stanford, stated that “it could be argued that President Bush is the most pro-
democracy and pro-democracy-promotion president in American history.  Certainly no previous 
American president has so elevated the goal of promoting democracy and freedom … as the 
central goal of his foreign policy.”15 
 The Bush administrations many initiatives in this area were distinctly distilled during 
Dobriansky’s testimony before the Committee on International Relations in 2005.  Broadly 
stated, the former administration’s “comprehensive democracy strategy … include[d] technical 
assistance, reporting and advocacy, public and private diplomacy, educational and cultural 
exchanges, and punitive measures.  It [was] bilateral and multilateral.”16  Coordination across the 
federal government of these different policies and initiatives took place through the Policy 
                                               
13
 Id. at 14 (statement of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobrianksy); see also Michael 
Mandelbaum, Democracy Without America, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 119, 119 (“The administration of 
George W. Bush has made democracy promotion a central aim of U.S. foreign policy.”). 
14
 Non-Governmental Organizations and Development of Democracy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar), available at 2006 WLNR 9895994 
(2006). 
15
 Statement of Larry Diamond, Panel: The Future of Democracy Promotion After Iraq, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
293, 299-300 (2007). 
16
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula 
Dobrianksy). 
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Coordinating Committee on Democracy, a working group convened by the National Security 
Council.17  The administration also focused much energy and efforts on the Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), which was designed to build on progress and reforms in 
that region.18  In the same region, the “Middle East Partnership Initiative … sought to bring the 
resources, experience, and determination of the United States to bear in an effort to bolster the 
reform movement in the Middle East.”19  Multilaterally, the United States worked with and 
through the Forum for the Future, the BMENA, the G-8, and other governmental and inter-
governmental bodies, “all united around a common agenda that advances the universal values of 
human dignity, democracy, economic opportunity, and social justice.”20  The administration 
additionally focused attention on women’s issues, including the establishment of the U.S.-
Afghan Women’s Council, and worked diligently to connect initiatives across thematic groups, 
such as trafficking, human rights and religious freedom, and public diplomacy via the broadcast 
media.21  More direct financial and institutional support was also apparent.  At the time of 
Dobriansky’s testimony, the United States Agency for International Development possessed 
funds of one billion dollars for democracy promotion efforts in over 80 countries worldwide.22  
The administration was also a driving force being the United Nations Democracy Fund, which 
provides support to innovative organizations supporting a wide variety of democracy promotion 
efforts, including rule of law initiatives and institution and capacity building in developing and 
transitional states.23 
                                               
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 20-21. 
22
 Id. at 19. 
23
 Id. at 19-20. 
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 The Bush administration’s accomplishments in this area should, however, be placed in 
broader context.  The administration did make significant strides in placing democracy 
promotion on international and regional agendas, and did disburse significant amounts to various 
nongovernmental groups pursuing democracy promotion initiatives.  Yet many times these funds 
did not reach the groups that most needed the money or could put that money to its best use.  
Additionally, many of the forums and working groups advanced by the Bush administration 
became simply talking groups, a place to advance the principles and justifications for democracy 
promotion, but not a source of concrete action towards the realization of those principles.  These 
criticisms, although certainly valid, are more in the line of a wish that the administration had 
gone further in taking actions to match its broad and expansive rhetoric on the issue of 
democracy promotion.  Nonetheless, in the area of democracy promotion the Bush 
administration has bequeathed to the Obama administration a legacy worth building upon and 
extending. 
Although there are a wide variety of tacts the new administration could use to further 
democracy promotion, the focus of the instant article is on a legislative enactment that should be 
brought to the fore in the new administration’s democracy promotion efforts and initiatives: The 
ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007.  Section II of this article reviews the provisions of that Act, 
states the implementation status of the relevant provisions, and addresses the broader importance 
of the policy and measures embodied therein.  Realizing that democracy promotion efforts are by 
no means a universally lauded proposition, Section III addresses some of the more widely held 
critiques of U.S. democracy promotion efforts, while ultimately concluding that none of the 
mainstream criticisms should hinder the continuing support for such efforts by the Obama 
administration.  Finally, Section IV provides a framework for how to proceed down the road to 
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more efficacious democracy promotion, while also taking aim at regimes that consistently and 
chronically thumb their noses at increasingly accepted democratic and human rights’ norms.  
Although in the final analysis vigorous democracy promotion may not be a panacea to all that 
ails the world, it undoubtedly has untapped potential to make the lives of countless millions far 
better and far more secure than they currently are.  This potential should itself be a sufficient 
ground by which the new administration can justify a measure of continuity with the previous 
administration. 
II.  THE ADVANCE DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2007 
 Section II of the instant article will proceed in two parts.  The first part addresses the 
ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 along the lines noted in the introduction; it reviews its 
provisions, notes the implementation status of the relevant sections, and explores the deeper 
policy initiatives behind the language of the specific provisions.  The second part of this section 
places the Act as passed within its historical context.  The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007, 
as passed by Congress, significantly differed from a previous version of the Act advanced by 
both the House and Senate in 2005, and by the House version of the Act introduced and reported 
in 2007.  The Act as passed was, to a large extent, a more “discretionary” version of these prior 
attempts to institutionalize democracy promotion in the State Department, although still a 
significant and important step forward.  Thus, the final part of this section addresses how the Act 
morphed from its 2005 introduction into its 2007 final form, while providing reasons why these 
changes took place. 
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A. The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 
The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007, or, by its more cumbersome title, the Advance 
Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Act of 2007,24 
was passed in August 2007 as Title XXI of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007.25  The ADVANCE Act was the culminating moment in a struggle 
extending back at least three years to institutionalize democracy promotion within the Bush 
administration and, in the words of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “reflects the interests of 
the Congress in working with the Administration to develop a comprehensive strategy that 
translates the objectives of democracy promotion into concrete steps toward the fulfillment of 
this mandate.”26  The Act focused on the State Department and a shift towards what the 
administration had termed “transformational diplomacy.”  The ADVANCE Act sought to 
enhance transformational diplomacy and “ensure that the Department of State, as an institution, 
embraces democracy promotion and the protection of human rights in a formal sense.”27  In the 
words of one notable supporter, the Act “would transform [U.S.] embassies into freedom houses 
and our ambassadors and other diplomats into active, trained supporters of non-violent 
campaigns for democracy.”28  In its long passage through the Congress, the Act was also 
supported by notable international democracy activists, including Soviet dissident Natan 
                                               
24
 Pub. L. No. 110-53, Title XXI, §§ 2101, et seq., 121 Stat. 526, codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 8201, et seq. (2007). 
25
 Pub. L. No. 11-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
26
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen). 
27
 Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). 
28
 Non-Governmental Organizations and Development of Democracy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Ambassador Mark Palmer), available at 2006 WLNR 9895406 
(2006). 
9 
 
Sharansky, who opined that he wished such an Act had been in place during his days in the 
former Soviet Union,29 and Rebiya Kadeer, a Chinese Uyghur political and democracy activist.30 
 The following subsections will deal with the provisions of the Act, broken down into 
three classifications: those dealing with the Congressional findings and framework of the Act, 
the policy provisions, and the institutional provisions.  Additionally, the implementation status of 
each relevant provision will be noted, along with the importance of the provision within the 
broader democracy promotion project. 
1. Congressional Findings and the Framework of the ADVANCE Act 
 The Congressional findings regarding the ADVANCE Act is the prism through which the 
remainder of the Act must be viewed.  These findings both ground the imperative to action and 
dictate the bounds of that action.  First and foremost in that list of findings is the observation that 
the foundational documents of the American polity, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution, guarantee to American citizens substantive rights and freedoms, as well as 
participatory rights in government, while also recognizing the fundamental equality of all human 
beings.31 Far from these rights, freedoms, and principles being solely American ideals, however, 
the Act recognizes that the development of international law in the wake of World War Two, 
specifically the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, reflects the very same ideals.32  
Despite this hint of universality about the ideals that undergird democracy, the Act does not fall 
within the familiar pitfall of thinking that one form of democracy can be readily imposed 
instantaneously in any country.  Rather, the Act recognizes that the “development of democracy 
constitutes a long-term challenge that goes through unique phases and paces in individual 
                                               
29
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (letter from Natan Sharansky). 
30
 Id. at 10 (letter from Rebiya Kadeer to Rep. Frank Wolf). 
31
 22 U.S.C. § 8201(1). 
32
 Id. 
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countries” as democratic institutions, including free media and an independent judiciary, 
develop.33  Most importantly, the ultimate development of democracy “must be led from within 
such countries,” a clear, though implicit, recognition that reform cannot be imposed from 
without.34 
 These two initial subsections of the Act establish a legal and moral foundation for action, 
while also delineating the lines within which that action must take place.  The subsequent 
subsections establish the need for action and the types of actions that can be advanced by both 
the United States and the general international community of democratic countries.  For instance, 
the Act recognizes what democracy and international scholars have termed a “democratic 
rollback:”35 “[i]ndividuals, nongovernmental organizations, and movements that support 
democratic principles, practices, and values are under increasing pressure from … governments 
of nondemocratic countries [and democratic transition countries], including by using 
administrative and regulatory mechanisms to undermine the activities of such individuals, 
organizations, and movements.”36  Nonetheless, the Congress determined that these setbacks can 
themselves be countered through improved assistance mechanisms to democratic reformers, an 
enhanced roll for democracy promotion within the diplomatic corps, and a “broad-based effort 
with cooperation between all democratic countries.”37 
 These findings are most important when viewed in the context of how to go about the 
business of democracy promotion.  It cannot be all about assistance or elections, but rather must 
focus on institutional development and targeted assistance to individuals devoted to beginning 
down, or maintaining their country’s travel on, the path to democracy.  Such a broad and 
                                               
33
 22 U.S.C. § 8201(2). 
34
 Id. 
35
 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, The Democratic Rollback, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-April 2008, at 36. 
36
 22 U.S.C. § 8201(3). 
37
 22 U.S.C. §§ 8201(5) & (6). 
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expansive view of what to target through democracy promotion initiatives greatly increases the 
chance that a country can start down the path to democracy or, in the case of transition countries, 
realize the final shift towards broad-based democratic governance.  As Jennifer Windsor, 
Executive Director of Freedom House, testified before the House Committee on International 
Relations in 2005, “the emergence of broadly based civic nonviolent coalitions is the most 
important condition and mechanism [for] creating democracy.”38  These civic coalitions can 
themselves then begin to institute the civil society reforms that are necessary to bring democracy 
to fruition.  As then-Senator Joseph Biden noted in 2006, these internal reforms provide the very 
foundation for further democracy promotion and the ultimate realization of democracy within a 
given country: “A democracy must rest on the foundation of a strong civil society – on building 
the institutions of democracy: political parties, effective government, independent media and 
judicial systems, non-governmental organizations and civil society.  [E]lections are important, 
but so is support for things like grassroots governance, human rights, and education for girls.  
We must put more emphasis on this necessary, comprehensive approach.”39  Along with 
providing the necessary catalyst for change, however, the type of broad-based democracy 
promotion effort envisioned by the ADVANCE Act is also important for the strength it will 
endow any resulting democracy.  Again in the words of Windsor, “[w]hat is critical is not just 
the importance of these factors in triggering transitions, but actually in determining the quality of 
democracy that results years after that transition.”40  In short, the concept of democracy 
promotion embraced by the Act will not only increase the chances that such efforts will succeed 
                                               
38
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 41 (2005) (statement of Jennifer Windsor). 
39
 Non-Governmental Organizations and Development of Democracy: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden), available at 2006 WLNR 9895993 (2006). 
40
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 41 (2005) (statement of Jennifer Windsor). 
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in bringing about democratic change, but may also ensure that such change is lasting while 
protecting against any potential “rollback” effect. 
 Section 8203 of the Act contains definitions, only one of which is of particular relevance 
to the instant article.  The Act defines “nondemocratic country or democratic transition country” 
in the following manner: 
 The term “nondemocratic country” or “democratic transition country” 
shall include any country which is not governed by a fully functioning democratic 
form of government, as determined by the Secretary [of State], taking into 
account the general consensus regarding the status of civil and political rights in a 
country by major nongovernmental organizations that conduct assessments of 
such conditions and whether the country exhibits the following characteristics: 
(A) All citizens of such country have the right to, and are not restricted in practice 
from, fully and freely participating in the political life of such country. 
(B) The national legislative body of such country and, if directly elected, the head 
of government of such country, are chosen by free, fair, open, and periodic 
elections, by universal and equal suffrage, and by secret ballot. 
(C) More than one political party in such country has candidates who seek elected 
office at the national level and such parties are not restricted in their political 
activities or their process for selecting such candidates, except for reasonable 
administrative requirements commonly applied in countries categorized as 
fully democratic. 
(D) All citizens in such country have a right to, and are not restricted in practice 
from, fully exercising such fundamental freedoms as the freedom of 
expression, conscience, and peaceful assembly and association, and such 
country has a free, independent, and pluralistic media. 
(E) The current government of such country did not come to power in a manner 
contrary to the rule of law. 
(F) Such country possesses an independent judiciary and the government of such 
country generally respects the rule of law. 
(G) Such country does not violate other core principles enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 1499/57 (entitled “Promotion of the Right to 
Democracy”), and the United Nations general Assembly Resolution 55/96 
(entitled “Promoting and consolidating democracy”). 
(H) As applicable, whether the country has scored favorably on the political, civil 
liberties, corruption, and rule of law indicators used to determine eligibility 
for financial assistance disbursed from the Millennium Challenge Account.41 
 
                                               
41
 22 U.S.C. § 8203(6). 
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This definition is extraordinarily important, as it recognizes that “democracy,” properly 
understood, is about a comprehensive form of governance and not simply about elections.  This 
is an important distinction in current international affairs, as the electoral victory of Hamas in 
Gaza demonstrated, but too often democracy promotion efforts are tied up with election 
monitoring and other electoral-directed activities.  Elections do not a democracy make, however, 
and, commensurate with the broad plan of action envisioned by section 8201, the Act takes into 
account a range of factors in determining whether a country is nondemocratic or in transition to 
democracy, not the least of which is its devotion to or abrogation of foundational liberal rights 
and freedoms. 
2. The Act’s Policy Provisions 
 The Act’s policy provisions prescribe a course of action to be implemented within the 
general framework of the Congressional findings, while also taking into account the definition 
the Act provides of “nondemocratic country” and “democratic transition country.”  Thus, the 
specific policy initiatives contemplated by the Act are manifold.  First, the Act places democracy 
promotion firmly within the canon of foreign policy goals by dictating that such efforts shall be 
“a fundamental component of United States foreign policy.”42  As a function of this general 
directive, the Act also contains specific constitutive  and derivative directives.  It reaffirms the 
United States’ commitment to the international rights and freedoms contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
places condemnation of any violations of the rights therein contained within the ambit of U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.43  It additionally establishes a policy of promoting, fostering, and 
protecting core human rights, including the freedoms of association, expression, press, religion, 
                                               
42
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(1). 
43
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(2). 
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and property.44  These policy provisions pertain to the protection and promotion of specific 
constitutive rights and freedoms that are inherent in any “realized” or transitioning democracy. 
 Relating back to Biden’s exhortation, and the expansive vision for democracy promotion 
embodied in the Congressional findings, section 8202(4) pertains to foundational issues and the 
United States’ policy on promoting institutional development within nondemocratic and 
transitional countries.  Thus, it shall be the policy of the United States “to commit to the long-
term challenge of promoting universal democracy by promoting democratic institutions, 
including institutions that support the rule of law [], an independent and professional media, 
strong legislatures, a thriving civil society, transparent and professional independent government 
auditing agencies, civilian control of the military, and institutions that promote the rights of 
minorities and women[.]”45  To bring these policies to life, so to speak, the Act provides that the 
United States will use its influence to provide political, economic, and other support to 
governments willing to undertake a democratic transition, and to nongovernmental and 
individual actors who are working within nondemocratic and democratic transition countries on 
behalf of democratic ideals and principles.46  Perhaps most importantly, the Act also envisions a 
strengthening of support between democratic countries in the common pursuit of promoting and 
consolidating democratic gains throughout the world.47 
 Section 8213 establishes authority to investigate and take action against violators of 
established international human rights norms.  The President and Secretary of State, together 
with the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs and the Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes Issues, “shall collect information regarding incidents that may constitute 
                                               
44
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(3). 
45
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(4). 
46
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(5). 
47
 22 U.S.C. § 8202(6). 
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crimes against humanity, genocide, slavery, or other violations of international humanitarian 
law.”48  Moreover, the Act further directs the President to ensure that any violators are brought to 
account in an appropriate forum.49  Bringing offenders to account is obviously a difficult task in 
an international order that is still, more or less, devoted to the notion of the inviolability of 
national sovereignty.  Nonetheless, significant norm-creating inroads have been made since 
Nuremberg, and the United States has both international options and domestic alternatives for the 
prosecution of individuals accused of crimes against humanity and other violations of 
international criminal and humanitarian law.  Regarding the investigative directive of this 
particular section, implementation is underway on two fronts.  First, the State Department’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has been collecting information via taskings to 
the Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau and the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Second, the Bureau has additionally begun to give grants to various indigenous organizations to 
collect such evidence of violations, an important move considering the often opaque view of the 
internal workings of nondemocratic and dictatorial regimes. 
 The need for specificity in democracy promotion efforts across different continents, 
cultures, and circumstances is bespoke by section 8221.  That section directs, inter alia, that the 
State Department build on its efforts to develop country specific strategies for promoting 
democracy by expanding those efforts to as many nondemocratic and democratic transition 
countries as possible.50  Additionally, the newly mandated “Annual Report on Advancing 
Freedom and Democracy” should contain the United States’ “priorities for the promotion of 
democracy and the protection of human rights for each nondemocratic country and democratic 
transition country,” as well as any “specific actions and activities of chiefs of missions and other 
                                               
48
 22 U.S.C. § 8213(a). 
49
 22 U.S.C. § 8213(b). 
50
 See 22 U.S.C. § 8221(a). 
16 
 
United States officials to promote democracy and protect human rights in each such country.”51  
This section has been technically implemented, but there will always be areas to build upon as 
events on the ground unfold in each subject country.  The first Advancing Democracy and 
Freedom Report was submitted to the Congress in May 2008, and contained strategies of varying 
complexity and efficacy for 106 countries.52  Although there is much still to be accomplished in 
the realm of creating and implementing strategies for democracy promotion in these countries, 
the 2008 Report provides a solid foundation for work in subsequent years, and certainly a good 
base from which the Obama administration can proceed with renewed vigor. 
 A similar country specific initiative, although seemingly mundane, is the directive that 
the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom, Trafficking in Persons Report, and any other discrete report on 
democracy and human rights, be timely translated “into the principal languages of as many 
countries as possible, with particular emphasis on nondemocratic countries, democratic transition 
countries, and countries in which extrajudicial killings, torture, or other serious violations of 
human rights have occurred.”53  This task is seemingly mundane, as it entails simply recounting 
abuses that have occurred, yet the power of accurate reporting on such issues should not be 
underestimated in the many countries where the state runs the media and the populace may be 
largely unaware of rampant abuses occurring in its communities.  As the internet likewise 
expands into even the most remote areas, a report posted on the local U.S. Embassy website or 
Department of State website might be the only information citizens have on the abuses of their 
governments.  Since passage of the ADVANCE Act, this provision has largely been 
implemented, with as many as 85% of the Human Rights Reports being translated into the native 
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language or languages of the subject state shortly after issuance.  Such quick and expansive 
translation had long been a goal of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and it is 
telling that it took a legislative enactment to push through such a simple, but far-reaching and 
important, reform.  This tension between the Bureau’s objectives and other sectors of the State 
Department, specifically the regional bureaus, although apparent here, is even more evident in 
the institutional provisions that will be addressed infra. 
 The remaining “policy” sections of the Act pertain to cooperative ventures with other 
democracies and the United States’ own various internal organizations working towards 
democracy promotion, and the funding of various democracy promotion programs and 
initiatives, domestic, regional, and international, and both governmental and nongovernmental in 
nature.  The most important of these provisions may be section 8262, which pertains to 
coordination and consultation between solely domestic democracy promotion programs and 
organizations.  Thus, the whole range of governmental institutions involved with democracy 
issues, including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as 
well as institutions like the government-funded National Endowment for Democracy, should 
increase their coordination both as to the development of strategies and initiatives aimed at 
democracy promotion and the delivery of such assistance to the end consumers.54  Moreover, the 
panoply of delivery methods and initiatives that could prove efficacious in promoting democratic 
transitions must be explored, and the internal guidelines for vetting ideas within the Executive 
Branch, and for consulting with Congress, should be strengthened so as to bring as much 
expertise to bear on these issues as is feasible.55  The importance of this provision should not be 
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underestimated, as a lack of coordination and consultation between the various arms of the U.S. 
government could lead to situations of “too much” and “too little” in any given area.  Moreover, 
a lack of internal consultation could impede U.S. cooperation with other countries or multilateral 
institutions, where it is integral that its foreign policy goals be declared in a unitary sense rather 
than as the prerogatives of the various agencies and departments that comprise the U.S. 
government.  Clear lines of planning and consultation increase the chances that U.S. democracy 
promotion efforts will succeed, that those efforts will be directed at the necessary and most 
important areas, and that the money appropriated for the pursuit of such efforts will be efficiently 
and economically disbursed and spent. 
Regarding the need for the United States to work with other democratic states on the 
international stage, in a provision regarding the sense of Congress, it is hoped that the United 
States will cooperate with other like-minded countries in the pursuit of democracy promotion.56  
Although such cooperation seems axiomatic if democracy promotion efforts are to succeed, such 
cooperation does not currently prevail, at least not at the level envisioned by the Act.  As 
Ambassador Palmer noted during his 2005 testimony before the House Committee on 
International Relations, “[t]he democracies produce 89% of the world’s GNP, we are 
overwhelmingly the most powerful militarily and in democracy we have by far the most 
magnetic political values and system.  But we all too often have not worked together.”57  This 
fact has to some extent changed since passage of the Act.  The State Department has increased 
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both its bilateral and multilateral cooperation and consultation with other democracies, so as to 
increase the democracies’ impact in various regional and international forums, while also 
consolidating and focusing policy vis-à-vis nondemocratic and democratic transition countries.  
Part and parcel with this reform is the establishment of a permanent Secretariat for the 
Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland.58  The Act sought such a permanent mechanism 
so as to increase the ability of the organization to conduct work and business between ministerial 
meetings, while also creating a more permanent presence that could be appealed to if 
necessary.59  However, the Act also proscribes participation in the Community of Democracies, 
and other “democratic” organizations aimed at democracy promotion, by nondemocratic states.60  
Such an exclusionary policy has broad support, was advocated by Republican presidential 
candidate Senator John McCain during the 2008 election cycle,61 and was forcefully espoused by 
Representative Tom Lantos during the 2005 House committee hearings on the Act.62  The Act 
also provides for the detail of American personnel to the Community of Democracies or any 
member-state thereof and the establishment of an office for multilateral democracy promotion to 
advocate for U.S. interests in various regional and international forums, but neither of these 
provisions has been implemented on account of staffing shortages and insufficient full-time 
employees at the State Department.63 
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 The financial commitments contemplated by the Act have likewise only been partially 
fulfilled.  Although an appropriation of one million dollars per annum for years 2008, 2009 and 
2010 was made for the International Center for Democratic Transition, only a portion of these 
appropriations has been disbursed.64  This is especially unfortunate, as the Center is the only 
multilateral institute specifically dedicated to issues of democracy promotion and democratic 
transitions.65  An amount of fourteen million dollars was appropriated for disbursement to the 
United Nations Democracy Fund for each of the years 2008 and 2009,66 yet, although twenty-
five millions dollars had been received by the Fund between the years 2006 and 2008, no funds 
have thus far been granted for 2009. 
3. The Act’s Institutional Provisions 
 The preceding two subsections dealt with the ADVANCE Act’s provisions pertaining to 
the general framework and thrust of the Act, as well as the Act’s provisions regarding policy.  
The instant section deals with those provisions that establish necessary institutional reforms 
within the Department of State regarding the personnel who will be charged with implementing, 
on a daily basis, the policy provisions of the Act, and who will be the face of American 
democracy promotion efforts to those individuals who most need the help the Act seeks to 
provide. 
                                               
64
 See 22 U.S.C. § 8251(d). 
65
 See Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House 
of Representatives, 109th Cong. 39 (2005) (statement of Ambassador Mark Palmer) (“It is striking that there are 
numerous multinational bodies like the World Bank and IMF responsible for economic development and quite 
intrusive in insisting upon modern free market economic strategies and programs.  There are no multinational 
equivalent institutions for political development, insisting upon and guiding transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy.”). 
 There are, however, other multilateral institutions devoted to democracy issues as they pertain to electoral 
politics and electoral assistance, such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, in 
Sweden.  See http://www.idea.int.  Additionally, several European countries have NED-like institutions to promote 
democracy abroad, including the United Kingdom (the Westminster Foundation for Democracy) and The 
Netherlands (The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy). 
66
 See 22 U.S.C. § 8261. 
21 
 
 First and foremost, the Act establishes the position of “Democracy Liaison Officer,” a 
post under and reporting to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor.67  These officers are meant to be posted at various international and regional missions, 
including the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and the Organization of 
American States, as well as any relevant specialized agencies within these broader organizations, 
regional public diplomacy centers of the Department of State, U.S. combatant commands, and 
other posts as designated by the Secretary of State.68  Once assigned, it is contemplated that these 
officers will provide their “hosts” with “expertise on effective approaches to promote and build 
democracy[,] assist in formulating and implementing strategies for transitions to democracy,” 
and fulfill any other relevant assignment given to them by the Department.69  Moreover, these 
positions are meant to be new positions, to be filled by new hires, rather than “reorganized” 
positions or positions simply realigned from elsewhere.70  Hiring and assignment of these 
individuals has, unfortunately, not yet taken place.  The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor would like to assign officers to the African Union, ASEAN, the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference, the Organization of American States, and the Community of Democracies, 
but it has not yet obtained the requisite number of full-time employee slots (FTEs) to do so.  One 
obvious reason for this failure was the need for additional FTEs for the Department’s missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, which has limited the availability of such positions for other bureaus and 
offices within the Department. 
                                               
67
 22 U.S.C. § 8211(a). 
68
 22 U.S.C. § 8211(a)(1). 
69
 22 U.S.C. § 8211(a)(2). 
70
 See 22 U.S.C. § 8211(a)(3). 
22 
 
 One reform within the Bureau that has been completed pertains to the establishment of an 
office related to democratic movements and transitions.71  This office was established consistent 
with the Congressional mandate after an internal reorganization within the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the requisite personnel assignments have been made 
to meet staffing concerns within the office.  The mandate of this office is relatively far-reaching, 
as it is charged with developing relations and consultation arrangements with democratic 
movements, nongovernmental organizations, the governments of other democratic countries, and 
individuals working toward promoting and consolidating democracy.72  Additionally, the office 
is directed to provide assistance to the Department’s regional bureaus in the development and 
implementation of strategies and programs aimed at fostering democracy in the nondemocratic 
and democratic transition countries falling within the respective purviews of those bureaus.73 
 Another significant provision pertains to the Chiefs of Mission in each nondemocratic 
and democratic transition country.74  The Act’s directive to these individuals is worth quoting in 
full, as it represents a seachange of sorts in the conduct of diplomacy by American missions in 
such countries: 
… Each chief of mission in each nondemocratic country or democratic transition 
country should— 
(1) develop, as part of annual program planning, a strategy to promote democratic 
principles, practices, and values in each such foreign country and to provide 
support, as appropriate, to nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and 
movements in each such country that are committed to democratic principles, 
practices, and values, such as by— 
(A) consulting and coordinating with and providing support to such 
nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and movements regarding the 
promotion of democracy; 
(B) issuing public condemnations of violations of internationally recognized 
human rights, including violations of religious freedom, and visiting local 
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landmarks and other local sites associated with nonviolent protest in 
support of democracy and freedom from oppression; and 
(C) holding periodic meetings with such nongovernmental organizations, 
individuals, and movements to discuss democracy and political, social, 
and economic freedoms; 
(2) hold ongoing discussions with the leaders of each such nondemocratic country 
or democratic transition country regarding progress toward a democratic 
system of governance and the development of political, social, and economic 
freedoms and respect for human rights, including freedom of religion or 
belief, in such country; and 
(3) conduct meetings with civil society, interviews with media that can directly 
reach citizens of each such country, and discussions with students and young 
people of each such country regarding progress toward a democratic system of 
governance and the development of political, social, and economic freedoms 
in each such country.75 
 
This provision dictates a forwarding looking, proactive posture by U.S. missions abroad in 
nondemocratic and democratic transition countries, centered on a pro-democracy action plan.76  
Such an approach is certainly contrary to traditional U.S. diplomacy in such states, which has 
centered on reacting to provocations rather than taking initial actions to increase the costs of such 
provocations or establishing an environment that makes clear such provocations are unacceptable 
and will not be tolerated.  As Ambassador Palmer testified in 2005: 
Often we find that our embassies and diplomacy are merely reactive – allowing 
the dictator to manipulate his own people and us, for example by regularly 
arresting people and then releasing them as a supposed sign of liberalization and 
response to us, even asking for policy rewards, only to have the same people or 
others arrested shortly thereafter.  As each country situation has its own specific 
features, our plans need to [be] well-grounded in reality, but they also need to be 
creative and benefit from successful experiences elsewhere.  Conventional 
diplomacy is fine under conventional circumstances, but often in non-democratic 
countries unconventional diplomacy is called for and works.77 
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The Ambassador’s testimony is borne out in his own experiences.  After serving in U.S. 
embassies in the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War and in Yugoslavia under 
General Tito, during which outreach to dissidents was often muzzled, the efficacy of 
Ambassador Palmer’s conception of “unconventional diplomacy” was demonstrated in Hungary 
in 1988, 1989 and 1990, when that country successfully transitioned to democracy after years of 
communist rule and a failed revolution in 1956 that saw the United States sit idly by as Soviet 
tanks rolled through Budapest.  Implementation of this policy shift is currently underway, as 
noted previously, insofar as country strategies for 104 countries were included in the first 
Advancing Democracy and Freedom Report, although these strategies do vary significantly in 
quality and detail.  The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is also enjoying close 
collaboration with the Offices of Foreign Assistance and Resource Management, to ensure that 
strategies are tied to budgetary realities, and the Department’s regional bureaus, so that the 
strategies adopted can reflect realities on the ground and be complementary with the 
Department’s various other goals and initiatives.  Nonetheless, it remains to be seen to what 
extent these action plans will actually be put into action. 
 The Act also established an Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion, which acts 
in a consultative capacity by advising the Secretary of State on how to “improve the capacity of 
the Department to promote democracy and human rights” and “how to improve foreign 
assistance programs related to the promotion of democracy.”78  Many other institutional reforms 
relate to the personnel system or issues that fall within the purview of the Department’s 
personnel system.  For instance, the Act establishes the ADVANCE Democracy Award, to be 
awarded to a Department employee on criteria to be established by the Secretary.79  Additionally, 
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the Act seeks to increase incentives for individuals to serve in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, and to target recruitment of Foreign Service Officers and others into the 
Bureau.80  A lack of willing personnel in the Bureau has been a chronic concern, exacerbated by 
the stress on Department personnel occasioned by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Another 
victim of this over-burdening is section 8212, establishing the Democracy Fellowship Program.81  
This provision sought to detail personnel associated with democracy promotion and human rights 
issues to domestic legislative offices, as well as international and nongovernmental 
organizations, with primary responsibility and oversight over issues pertaining to democracy and 
human rights.82  Such detailing has not occurred, with the main reason given the pressure of 
staffing posts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 A mundane, yet important directive, is contained in section 8232, which relates to the 
Department’s website and the need to have a site dedicated to issues of global democracy and 
human rights.83  This type of site is important in the same way that translations of the various 
U.S. government human rights reports is – it might be the only fount of true information for 
citizens regarding what is going on in their countries.  This section specifically refers to the need 
to have the major human rights reports posted, especially in translations, but goes further and 
notes the importance of including narratives and histories of prior successful democratic 
movements and of the general importance of ensuring democracy and protection for human 
rights.84  This provision has largely been implemented, and the Bureau is likely to have all 
relevant information included on the democracy website by the end of 2009.85  In addition, the 
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Bureau itself is seeking to update its own State Department website with relevant information, 
perhaps overlapping in places.86 
 Finally, the issue of training.  Section 8241 is directed at training members of the Foreign 
Service and career civil service in democracy promotion and the protection of human rights.87  
On this count, reform is needed both in reaching those individuals who need the necessary 
training, and in promulgating relevant and quality materials to use in such training.  Training in 
democracy promotion and human rights within the Department is currently spotty, both 
regarding personnel trained and the materials used.  A “Diplomat’s Handbook” on democracy 
promotion has been compiled and is in use at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute,88 but 
the Act also directs additional training and compilation of materials in a number of other areas: 
(1) International documents and United States policy regarding the promotion of 
democracy and respect for human rights. 
(2) United States policy regarding the promotion and strengthening of democracy 
around the world, with particular emphasis on the transition to democracy in 
nondemocratic countries and democratic transitions countries. 
(3) For any member, chief of mission, or deputy chief of mission who is to be 
assigned to a nondemocratic country or democratic transition country, ways to 
promote democracy in such country and to assist individuals, 
nongovernmental organizations, and movements in such country that support 
democratic principles, practices, and values. 
(4) The protection of internationally recognized human rights (including the 
protection of religious freedom) and standards related to such rights, 
provisions of United States law related to such rights, diplomatic tools to 
promote respect for such rights, and the protection of individuals who have 
fled their countries due to violations of such rights.89 
 
Progress on meeting the Act’s requirements in these areas is underway, but is far from complete.  
This is not surprising, given that this section represents the practical side of the Act’s embrace of 
transformational diplomacy and the central role that U.S. missions abroad must take in being 
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proactive about the protection of human rights and the advancement and promotion of 
democratic ideals.  Nonetheless, a definitive push on these educational and training issues may 
only come if democracy promotion and human rights protection holds a place of importance 
within the new administration’s foreign policy goals.  Otherwise, the inertia of tradition and 
long-practice may carry the day. 
*  *  * 
 The ADVANCE Act provides the skeleton over which the Obama administration can lay 
the flesh of renewed democracy promotion efforts – so long as the administration is willing to 
incorporate democracy promotion as a central focus of its foreign policy, and is capable of 
devoting the necessary resources and time to the issues raised by such an incorporation.  Much 
still needs to be accomplished from an implementation point of view, and the actual 
implementation of the act must be brought to concrete reality.  It is one thing to dictate that 
Chiefs of Mission in nondemocratic countries establish action plans; it is quite another to ensure 
that these individuals put their plans into action and take steps towards advancing democratic 
ideals in these closeted countries.  In light of domestic and international economic troubles, 
existing U.S. financial and assistance commitments in the developing world and two existing 
combat theaters, and a general backlash against democracy promotion efforts in the United States 
and more generally in the democratic world, it may be too much to hope that the administration 
embraces democracy promotion in its first year in office.  Nonetheless, it does have a ready-
made framework from which to launch such efforts should it desire to take the initiative. 
 Ultimately, as recognized in the introduction, democracy promotion efforts are of 
strategic interest to the United States, not simply a “feel-good” initiative to vacuously promote 
freedom and human rights.  Dealing with democracies in resource rich areas, such as the Urals 
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and the Middle East, would be infinitely easier than dealing with the petulant Russian 
government or the opportunistic authoritarian regimes of the greater Middle East and North 
Africa.  From a security perspective, the expansion of freedom in the world serves as a buffer to 
extremism, and it is oft correctly stated that, since the advent of the modern international legal 
order, democracies do not go to war with other democracies.  The mere confluence of interests 
between democracies also serves to focus regional and international debate on important issues, 
such as climate change.  In short, there is not only a moral imperative to action, but also very real 
strategic interests in play when one discusses the issue of democracy promotion.  Fitting 
democracy promotion within the broader rubric of this administration’s foreign policy would pay 
dividends on any number of currently contentious issues, while also increasing the likelihood 
that the future will be more peaceful and tranquil than the present. 
B. A Cautionary Coda: The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 in Historical Context 
 The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007, written and passed as Title XXI of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, is the law of the United 
States, and it is the text of that law as passed that the Obama administration must deal with in its 
own democracy promotion efforts.  Nonetheless, as noted frequently in the foregoing, the 
ADVANCE Act is itself the product of a long history of back-and-forth between Congress and 
former President Bush, in which the Act gradually lost a significant portion of its mandatory 
character.  This history is worth noting in passing, as the struggle to get the ADVANCE 
Democracy Act of 2007 passed in any form can serve as a cautionary tale of sorts to proponents 
of democracy promotion in the executive and legislative branches, as well as in non-
governmental organizations.  Even with a sympathetic president in place, the kind of far-
reaching reforms that are necessary to vigorously advance democracy promotion efforts may 
29 
 
come up against entrenched interests that have little inclination to budge.  Nonetheless, with an 
administration currently in place that, at least in its campaign rhetoric, is far less infatuated with 
assertions of executive power, it may be hoped that more progressive steps down this path may 
be taken in the coming months and years. 
 The first incarnation of what would become the ADVANCE Democracy Act was 
simultaneously introduced in the House and Senate on March 3, 2005, through bipartisan co-
sponsors Representatives Frank Wolf, Tom Lantos, Christopher Smith, and Donald Payne, and 
Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman.90  This first version of the bill included several 
provisions that were dropped not only from the final implementation of the Act, but even the 
version introduced in the House in 2007.  Among other provisions, H.R. 1133 sought to codify 
the position of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs,91 establish regional democracy hubs 
that would support the U.S. missions in nondemocratic countries falling within their geographic 
region,92 mandate a yearly report regarding the status of U.S. cooperation with other democracies 
on the issues of democracy promotion and protection of human rights,93 and establish a working 
group specifically charged with gauging the progress of democracy promotion efforts in 
nondemocratic and democratic transition countries.94  Other provisions represent far more 
comprehensive versions of provisions that were eventually included in the final act as passed in 
2007, including those pertaining to the advisory committee and the training of Foreign Service 
Officers.95  The most far reaching provisions sought to ensure that executive and Departmental 
appointments to diplomatic missions in nondemocratic countries went to individuals who 
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displayed special competence in democracy promotion,96 encouraged the President to take a 
range of actions in regards to countries that are deemed nondemocratic on the criteria established 
by the Act,97 and mandated the position of Special Assistant for nondemocratic countries on the 
National Security Council.98  Ultimately, however, this version of the ADVANCE Democracy 
Act was not passed, and little action was taken on the legislative front for almost two years. 
 The second incarnation of the Act is the House version of the bill that would, after 
consultation with the Senate, become the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007.99  This version of 
the Act closely mirrors the implemented version, from its statement of policy and its definition of 
nondemocratic country,100 to its substantive provisions providing for an Office Related to 
Democratic Movements and Transitions, Democracy Liaison Officers, additional training in 
democracy promotion and human rights for Foreign Service Officers, and its establishment of an 
Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion.101  Nonetheless, significant portions of the 
initial House version of the Act were omitted from the final implementation.  In a “sense of the 
Congress” provision, H.R. 982 pronounced that there should be three Deputy Assistant 
Secretaries of State overseeing the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, rather than 
the one such position currently prevailing.102  Congress also included a provision that required 
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the executive branch to monitor and document the financial assets held in the United States by 
nondemocratic leaders and their associates.103  Neither of these provisions has a counterpart in 
the Act as passed.  Another, more grievous omission, pertains to the appointment of Foreign 
Service Officers in nondemocratic countries.  Section 109 of H.R. 982 provided for the 
amendment of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 by adding the following sentence to 22 U.S.C. § 
3944(a)(1): “If the country in which the individual is to serve is a nondemocratic country or a 
democratic transition country as defined in section 5 of the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007, 
the individual should possess clearly demonstrated competence in and commitment to the 
promotion of democracy, including competence in promoting democratic principles, practices, 
and values, such as through regular interaction with individuals, including students and young 
people, who support and advocate such principles, practices, and values.”104  There is, 
unfortunately, nothing in the final version of the Act that addresses an individual’s qualifications 
to serve in a mission in a nondemocratic or democratic transition country. 
 These omissions are troubling in themselves, but perhaps more so are the places where 
the initial House version of the Act does have a final implementation counterpart, but one where 
the mandatory nature of the initial provision was stripped.  For instance, section 101(b)(5) of 
H.R. 982 directs that at least 50% of the non-administrative staff of the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor should be Foreign Service Officers by December 31, 2012.105  The 
final Act simply directs the Department to establish more targeted recruitment into the Bureau, 
with no hard number or temporal limits for that recruitment.106  Regarding the actions that 
Democracy Liaison Officers are charged to undertake, the initial House bill directed that these 
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Officers “shall” undertake the activities within the purview of their job description, including 
providing “expertise on effective approaches to promote and build democracy,” assisting “in 
conceiving and implementing strategies for transitions to democracy,” and carrying “out such 
other responsibilities as the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary may assign.”107  Although the 
range and nature of the activities these Officers are charged with undertaking did not change in 
the final version of the Act, the “shall” was replaced with the far more discretionary “should” 
regarding the imperative to action.108  This same replacement of language is evident in the 
provisions dealing with the actions to be undertaken by the chiefs of mission.109  Moreover, a 
specific and important provision relating to the actions to be undertaken by the chiefs of mission 
was omitted from the final version of the bill.  The House version directed chiefs of mission or 
other principal officers of the local mission to “spend time at universities and other institutions of 
higher learning to [] debate and discuss values and policies that promote democracy [and] [] 
communicate, promote, and defend such United States values and policies.”110  This type of 
outreach is tremendously important, as recently highlighted once again by the fallout following 
the contested presidential election in Iran, as universities and colleges are often hotbeds for 
change. 
 If Representative Ros-Lehtinen was correct in expressing the thought that the House bill 
as introduced represented a collaboration between the Congress and the Bush administration,111 
why is it that the Act was largely stripped of its mandatory character by the time it was passed 
into law?  The answer is that the rhetoric of the Bush administration conflicted to a large degree 
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with its own expansive view of the powers of the President and the focal point of the presidency 
itself in the theory of the unitary executive.  This fact is succinctly summed up in the 
administration’s statement of policy following the inclusion of H.R. 1133 as Title VI of H.R. 
2601, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.112  The 
administration did note its appreciation of the intent behind the ADVANCE Democracy Act, but 
thought that many of the provisions could constrain the administration’s conduct of foreign 
affairs by limiting its ability to disburse discretionary foreign assistance, unduly limiting the 
Secretary’s own ability to manage personnel positions and offices within the Department, and 
infringing on the “President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs and 
supervise the unitary Executive Branch.”113  Accordingly, rather than mandating, for instance, 
that Democracy Liaison Officers and Chiefs of Mission shall take certain actions, the final act 
bowed to executive branch pressures requesting greater discretion in whether or not and to what 
extent they would carry out the objectives of the Act in any given situation.  This is to say only 
that, within the broader framework of the Act, the Department maintains the discretion to dictate 
the missions of the Liaison Officers and Chiefs of Missions, rather than having those missions 
mandated by Congress via legislation.  In a sense, then, the Department retains the discretion to 
do what it has always had the discretion to do, but now must do so within a distinct framework.  
Again, the ADVANCE Democracy Act does represent a significant step forward, and its 
provisions can serve as a baseline from which democracy promotion efforts can and should be 
launched.  Nonetheless, for these efforts to prove truly efficacious, the Obama administration 
must be less beholden to claims of executive power and must strip away some of the discretion 
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that the Department of State now enjoys in the advancement of these goals.  In this sense, the 
current administration can transcend the rhetoric of its direct forbear and truly match actions to 
its words. 
III.  CRITIQUES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 Thus far, this article has assumed that democracy promotion should continue to be a part 
of the United States foreign policy agenda and given an explication of a Congressional 
enactment designed to institutionalize democracy promotion as a central facet of the United 
States’ engagement with the international community.  In Section IV, infra, this article will also 
address areas and ways in which the United States can build on what has been accomplished over 
the preceding decades in the field of democracy promotion, so as to increase the likelihood that 
we can see a more free world in the near term and a totally free world in the not-too-distant 
future.  Yet no matter how “magnetic” the idea of democracy is, the concept of democracy 
promotion does not enjoy any universal appeal within Western countries, and has engendered 
significant animosity in the many nondemocratic and democratic transition countries throughout 
the world.  In some ways, this may be easy to understand.  Obviously, nondemocratic regimes, 
and even democratic transition governments, may have significant vested interests in the status 
quo.  Why individuals in existing democratic countries should oppose efforts to more fully 
realize democracy abroad is a different matter.  Although this article means to be constructive in 
nature, it would be remiss if it failed to address some of the most prominent critiques of the 
democracy promotion project currently prevailing in foreign policy circles.  What follows is a 
brief explication of three of these critiques, those that I believe carry the most weight within the 
current debate, as well as refutations of their logic. 
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A.  Democracy Promotion = Regime Change / Imposition by Force 
 The conflation of democracy promotion with regime change, or the notion that 
democracy can be imposed at the end of a rifle, is an unfortunate repercussion of the Bush 
administration’s post hoc rationalization of the Iraq war.  As current Vice-President Biden stated 
in 2006, “[f]airly or not, the [Bush] administration has created the impression around the world 
that it believes democracy can be imposed by force.”114  Biden’s view was mirrored in an article 
by Thomas Carothers in the March/April 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, wherein Carothers noted 
that, for the vast majority of the world’s populace, the United States’ rhetoric regarding 
democracy promotion and the Iraq war gave the impression that the phrase “democracy 
promotion” was nothing more than veiled short-hand for regime change or invasion.115  In the 
same hearing in which Biden’s statement was made, Senator Richard Lugar opined that 
“[g]roups that promote democracy must come to grips with the fact that they are being vilified 
for allegedly promoting regime change.”116  To take the cue from then Senator Biden, these 
assertions are unfair characterizations of what has transpired both during the Bush years, and 
generally throughout the history of U.S. democracy promotion efforts. 
 President Bush did not go to war in Afghanistan or Iraq to impose democracy on those 
populations.  Each conflict was supported by strategic rationales that have held up to the test of 
time and scrutiny to varying degrees.  Nonetheless, what can be said with some certainty is that 
neither invasion was part of a global crusade to impose democracy.  Ironically, the history of the 
U.S. cuts against any assertion that it has favored domestic constituents who crave democracy, 
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from the imposition of the Shah in Iran, to the toppling of Salvador Allende in Chile, to the 
continued support of any number of Middle East and African dictators.  There was no rhetoric to 
support these assertions outside the Iraq war, and even then, the notion arose solely because the 
administration felt placed on the defensive by the failure to find the claimed weapons of mass 
destruction.  In short, there is no support in reality for the proposition that U.S. support for 
democracy promotion is code for regime change or violent imposition of democracy. 
 From the outside looking in, obviously regime change, broadly understood, is the end 
goal of democracy promotion.  The ideal seeks to have democracy win the day, which means, in 
a nondemocratic country, vanquishing the nondemocratic ruler or, in a democratic transition 
country, ensuring that the last vestiges of the old regime are swept out with the chafe.  Yet 
democracy promotion from the United States side is simply aid for one side in a domestic 
struggle.  It is not violent in nature, nor does the ADVANCE Act itself countenance anything but 
support and appropriations for non-violent groups and organizations.  This approach seeks to 
place democracy within the market place of ideas – a place where it is not welcome in the many 
countries where authoritarianism remains dogma.  No matter how threatened these rulers may 
feel, however, they will ultimately be defeated by the better system, not by American guns or 
soldiers.  In the final analysis, “[w]e should not allow the complexities of Afghanistan and Iraq 
to obscure the successes of non-violent democracy promotion or to sap our will to persevere.”117  
Thus, this critique provides no basis from which the Obama administration could or should 
conclude that the types of non-violent democracy promotion efforts contemplated by the 
ADVANCE Act need to be shelved. 
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B.  Some Countries Are Not Amenable to Democracy 
 This invidious argument proposes that democracy, and the ideals that undergird 
democracy, is a specifically Western construct rather than a system of universal appeal and 
significance.  That being the case, democracy promotion is doomed to fail, as it simply will not 
“play” well in most non-Western settings, whether that setting be Asia, the Middle East, Africa, 
or elsewhere.118  As Mohsen Milani recently wrote in relation to Iran, “[democracy promotion is 
m]ore a feel-good fantasy than a viable strategy, [which] [] misleadingly assumes that democracy 
can be exported, like cars, or imposed by force[.]”119  The notion that Iran could not be fertile 
ground for democracy is itself incompatible with the massive protests following the contested 
2009 presidential election, but even more generally, arguments such as Milani’s rest on several 
false premises concerning the capabilities and end goals of democracy promotion. 
 First, these arguments assume that democracy, as conceived by democracy promoters, is 
constructed as a ready-made system of governance that can be implemented fully in any country, 
given the right opportunity.  This assumption pertains both to the method of promoting 
democracy, and the qualitative aspect of the democracy that may be realized.  Regarding the 
method, it is patently false, as is clear from even a cursory reading of the ADVANCE Act.  That 
Act recognizes the many different cultures, systems, and histories of the remaining 
nondemocratic countries, and seeks plans premised on what will fit each country best.  This 
determination itself is meant to be made only in consultation with local activists and interested 
parties, not by some bureaucrat in Washington dictating end-results from afar.  This personalized 
and specific approach does not contemplate a one-size-fits-all mentality, and the Act, in its 
substantive provisions and its statement of findings, disclaims any attempts to approach 
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democracy promotion in this way.  The result of the case-specific approach is that democracy in 
one place will never look identical to democracy in another place.  The United States, England, 
France, Turkey, and South Africa are all democracies, but the countries have a great deal of 
obvious differences, from executive leadership, to voting procedures, to the nature of the 
substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed.  An example of a country in transition is China, 
where many democratic and market reforms have been embraced, although an authoritarian state 
remains.  But one can rest assured that, if and when democracy comes to China, it may look very 
different from other Western democracies, despite a certain base-line of similarities.120  As a 
threshold matter, however, the Act’s requirement for specific strategy plans implemented on a 
country-by-country basis means that any domestic circumstances can be accounted for in the 
implementation of democracy promotion initiatives. 
 Second, a usual facet of this argument is that a specific class of people is incapable of 
embracing democracy, either because of their peculiar history or on account of the pre-existence 
of a similarly “total” system, such as Islam, already dominating the relevant society.  This 
argument fails on empirical evidence, and on any meaningful engagement with the allegedly 
incompatible system.  A recent book highlights the accomplishments and travails of a number of 
democracy and human rights activists operating in a group of nondemocratic countries whose 
populations have largely been written off as not particularly inclined towards democracy, 
whether for historical or religious reasons.121  The existence of these activists, in Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Palestine, Kuwait, and Syria, as well as other countries not mentioned, belies 
any blanket statement to the effect that individuals in these countries will not militate for change 
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along more liberal lines.  In fact, the successes of the activists mentioned might well have been 
greater and more significant had U.S. efforts to reach out to them been coordinated and 
systematized in the way the ADVANCE Act contemplates they will be.  The claim against Islam 
is more scurrilous than the nationalist claims, as it plays on obvious phobias and prejudices 
arising from the 9/11 tragedy, and is less grounded in a meaningful engagement with the system 
pilloried.  Most who advance this claim, if not nearly all, have no true understanding of Islam, 
and base their assertions on understandings cribbed from the radicals and extremists who many 
Muslims view as highjackers in their own right – they have highjacked a religion for alternative 
purposes that, even close to a decade after 9/11, are not entirely crystalline.  I am not an expert 
on Islam either, but I am inclined to agree with positions advocated by Muslims who generally 
do yearn for more liberal values.  Benazir Bhutto’s legacy will be just such a treatise, which 
distills Islam and Sharia law in clear and lucid prose, while demonstrating not only the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy, but the very real desire of many Muslims living under the 
yoke of authoritarianism to break free.122 
 Judged fairly and impartially, there are no inherent hurdles to democracy promotion in 
those countries which remain nondemocratic or only partly free.  As Under Secretary Dobriansky 
testified, “[w]e see that freedom’s call is resonating with more and more people around the 
world.  From Georgia to Ukraine to Iraq to Lebanon to Afghanistan, the cynicism of skeptics and 
the oppression of autocrats has been answered by peaceful protests, ballot boxes, and 
constitution drafts.”123  The incoming administration has the opportunity to ensure that freedom’s 
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call will continue to resonate in new areas of the world, without drawing tenuous and unfounded 
distinctions regarding who is and who is not capable or willing to embrace democracy. 
C.  Democratic Gains Should be Consolidated 
 Finally, some argue that rather than expending funds and resources promoting democracy 
in nondemocratic countries, the United States and its democratic brethren should focus on 
ensuring the successful and lasting transition of partially democratic countries into the 
democratic column.124  In essence, the United States should consolidate the gains it has made 
over the past two decades rather than seeking new windmills to tilt.  There is undoubtedly some 
truth to the notion that countries that were on the road to democracy in the early 1990’s have 
backslid, with Russia often being cited as the archetypal example.125  It is not so much that 
democratic countries are becoming nondemocratic, however, but rather that transitioning 
countries have returned to authoritarian rule, or simply stalled in their transition.  This can at 
least partially be attributed to the rapid process of democratization in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, which is unlikely to be matched at any subsequent stage of the democracy promotion 
project.126  Judged against those successes, certainly, progress has slowed and the outlook in 
dislodging the world’s remaining authoritarian regimes looks dimmer. 
 Without arguing about whether this trend exists, and there is by no means total agreement 
that there has been any meaningful backslide,127 there is no necessary tension between 
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consolidating gains and continuing to support democratic groups in nondemocratic countries.  As 
an initial matter, this critique does carry the most weight of those surveyed, for the very practical 
reason that it is based on underlying realities – finite budgetary and temporal resources.  The 
United States, along with its democratic allies, has only a limited amount of funds it can disburse 
and only a limited number of personnel to assign to any given problem, region, or task.  In light 
of these obvious limitations, then, it certainly makes sense to devote those resources that we do 
have available to ensuring that countries who have started down the road of democratization 
reach the end goal of democratic governance and remain firmly within the democratic camp.  Yet 
a certain logic is all this critique has going for it. 
 There is no reason that democracy promotion cannot proceed along side the consolidation 
of gains that have been made in the previous decade.  For one, there is not necessarily significant 
personnel overlap between consolidation and promotion.  As made clear in the ADVANCE Act, 
a great deal of responsibility will devolve to the chiefs of mission in nondemocratic and 
democratic transition countries, meaning that the front-line fighters for democracy promotion 
will not have to choose between promotion and consolidation – the choice will have been made 
for them by their placement within the United States’ global diplomatic web.  To the extent that a 
certain upper echelon of bureaucrats will be concerned with both issues, consolidation and 
promotion mutually inform each other, and any work done in one realm is clearly applicable, and 
transferable, to the other.  Finances may force difficult choices at different stages during the 
promotion and consolidation process, but the mere fact that one may have to make such choices 
in the future is not a reason to forego one road for the other at this stage.  Promotion and 
consolidation can proceed side-by-side as foreign policy goals, notwithstanding the fact that at 
certain junctures, one may necessarily have to take priority over the other.  Yet this is the exact 
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quandary virtually every aspect of foreign policy finds itself in.  In short, there is no definitive 
argument against pursuing democracy promotion in nondemocratic countries while consolidation 
is proceeding in transitioning and newly democratic countries. 
IV.  STRENGTHENING AND DIVERSIFYING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 So, the Obama administration has a necessary and bipartisan-supported tool already in 
place from which to launch renewed democracy promotion efforts, and none of the prevailing 
critiques of democracy promotion as a project strike definitive blows.  What is left, then, is the 
question of where to go from here?  The ADVANCE Act provides a necessary baseline from 
which to proceed, but it should not be left on its own in the fight to extend the reach of 
democracy in the Twenty-First Century.  Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 2006, Ambassador Palmer optimistically stated that “[a]chieving a 100% 
democratic world is possible over the next quarter century – but only with radical strengthening 
of our primary frontline fighters for freedom.”128  It is the purpose of the instant section to 
explore ways in which the Ambassador’s optimistic pronouncement may be brought to fruition. 
A.  Full Implementation of the ADVANCE Act Should be a Priority 
 The easiest way to quickly strengthen the United States’ capabilities regarding 
democracy promotion is to fully implement those provisions of the ADVANCE Act that have 
heretofore not been implemented or been only partially implemented, and to ensure that the shift 
to transformational diplomacy takes hold in the U.S. diplomatic corps.  Foremost among these 
implementation priorities should be an increase in the number of FTEs devoted to democracy 
promotion efforts.  This would permit the contemplated detail of State Department personnel to 
various regional and international organizations, as well as endowing the Department with a 
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corps of employees who can pursue the democracy promotion agenda in a more focused and 
deliberate way.129  Implementation of more full-time positions targeted at democracy promotion 
should be possible once the personnel pressures of Iraq and Afghanistan begin to wane, as well 
as if Secretary Clinton is successful in persuading those holding the purse-strings that the State 
Department has suffered from chronic under-funding over the course of the previous decades.130  
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor should also work closely with the 
personnel office at the State Department to establish a plan to implement more targeted 
recruiting into the Bureau.131  Commensurate with such targeted recruitment, the Bureau should 
also work closely with the Foreign Service Institute in devising a rigorous and expansive course 
of study and training for Officers devoted to positions involving democracy promotion and 
advocacy on behalf of human rights.132  Finally, as pertains to specifically internal 
implementation necessities, the Department and Bureau should work to finish the upgrades to 
their websites so as to ensure that relevant democracy and human rights information is available 
to as many individuals as possible in as many languages as possible, especially those working 
within nondemocratic and democratic transition countries.133  Again, this may seem like a 
mundane issue, yet the power of information should not be underestimated. 
 Funding will most likely be a chronic problem, but amounts should be spent and 
disbursed commensurate with the amounts appropriated, something that has not yet occurred.134  
Organizations such as the Democratic Transition Center should also be given significantly more 
attention than they now garner.  Ambassador Palmer was correct to question why there are so 
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many regional and international bodies militating for capitalist market reforms, yet no such 
mainstream organizations advocating similar political and governmental reforms.135  Given the 
right resources, the Democratic Transition Center may be able to make real inroads in some of 
the more intransigent areas of the authoritarian world, which would have the effect of also 
increasing the odds that these countries can liberalize economically.136  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, each diplomatic mission currently operating in a nondemocratic country or 
democratic transition country must act more aggressively in establishing specific and detailed 
country-oriented policies for promoting democracy within their given state.137  These strategic 
plans must be a collaborative and ongoing project, involving the main stake-holders and 
democratic activists in each state, and they must be grounded in practical realities rather than 
rhetoric and verbiage.  Doing what is possible at each step, while always keeping the end goal in 
focus, will prove far more significant in instituting change than merely relying on grandiloquent 
statements about the “inexorable path of freedom.” 
 These final implementation issues are comparatively small concerns when viewed in light 
of the passage of the Act itself.  Nonetheless, the Obama administration should work as quickly 
as possible in placing these final pieces of the ADVANCE Act puzzle into place.  Funding and 
personnel issues may linger for a longer time than would be desired, but other aspects of the Act, 
including most specifically the promulgation of the country-specific strategy plans, need not, and 
should not, wait any longer.  Plans that have been established should be revisited and honed, 
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where necessary, and those countries lacking any detailed and targeted plan should be directed to 
draw up such initiatives by the end of 2010. 
B.  U.S. Advocacy for a Right to Democracy 
 Advocacy for a “right to democracy” under international human rights law is nothing 
new, and has roots extending at least as far back as the early 1990’s and the period of expansive 
democratization following the fall of the Soviet Union.138  Since that time, an explicit right to 
democracy has been recognized and institutionalized by the Organization of American States,139 
and been pronounced by the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights.140  
Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly has itself advocated on behalf of promoting 
democracy and consolidating democratic gains.141  Besides these explicit pronouncements of a 
right to democracy, it is clear that prevailing international law largely protects all those rights, 
both substantive and procedural, that comprise modern conceptions of liberal democracy.142  
Prevailing international law protects participatory rights in government, as well as the most 
important substantive rights, including the freedoms of assembly, free speech, and the press.  
Although it seems that these international instruments are more honored in the breach, at times, it 
cannot be said that they do not reflect the current status of the international legal order.  Some 
have even argued that the existence of these legal obligations coupled with state observance 
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thereof have created a customary international law right to democracy.143  To the contrary, others 
contend that these instruments solely contain a hortatory obligation on the part of states to 
develop towards democracy.144  The view that there is a customary international law right to 
democracy may assume too much, at least at this stage, but the view that these instruments 
establish a bare obligation to develop towards democracy degrades the rights already recognized 
under international law.  It seems clear that if a state were to respect the rights contained in the 
established human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, that state could not be anything but a democracy.  A state that would adhere to the 
precepts contained in these treaties would respect the populace’s participatory rights in 
governance, as well as a substantial swath of substantive rights, from the rights to due process, 
life, and liberty, to the specific freedoms of assembly, free speech, and the press, to mention just 
a few.  Looked at in this way, the right to democracy becomes a kind of second-order right, itself 
derived from the respect for these other discrete rights, as well as a right culminative in nature – 
the end result of the state’s respect for its citizens’ particular human rights. 
 The United States should be at the forefront of this effort to advocate on behalf of a right 
to democracy in the present, as it has been previously in both the former Human Rights 
Commission and the Organization of American States.  This advocacy should continue in the 
form of non-binding resolutions and pronouncements, such as those made by the OAS and 
United Nations General Assemblies, but it could also take the form of a more legally binding 
convention or treaty, either regional in nature or under the auspices of the United Nations.145  
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Such an approach would have the benefit of grouping together in one instrument all those rights 
and freedoms deemed necessary for democratic governance to flourish, and declaring that 
respect for the listed rights and freedoms is the baseline a country will have to meet in order to 
be deemed democratic under international law.  However the United States proceeds in this area, 
it should rest assured that its advocacy of a right to democracy serves its long-term strategic 
interests as well as representing the global realization of those ideals and imperatives that lead to 
its own founding over two centuries ago. 
C.  International Action Against Dictatorship and Authoritarian Rule 
 Although there were undoubtedly positive defining moments for humanity during the 
course of the Twentieth Century, to a large extent that time period was defined by such unsavory 
terms and phrases as war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  Looking to the personalities 
behind the century’s worst atrocities, it is not difficult to find a unifying characteristic: 
The 20th Century was the bloodiest in human history because dictators made it so.  
An estimated 169 million people died at the hands of their own leads – Hitler, 
Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein – an 
estimated three times that also historic number of combatants killed in the wars 
started by these same men.  The 21st century could be even bloodier and filled 
with wars as the world’s remaining dictators have or are seeking to gain weapons 
of mass destruction and foster or actively support terrorists themselves intent 
upon massive destruction.146 
 
Authoritarian rule, especially dictatorships, is the target of democracy promotion efforts, insofar 
as these efforts seek to have democracy triumph and take the place of these regimes.  Though 
this “replacement” is central to the theory and practice of democracy promotion, authoritarian 
regimes, as such, are not particularly targeted.  Democracy promotion is meant to be a 
constructive process which lives in the advancement of the benefits democracy can bring, 
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especially when juxtaposed against the prevailing domestic status quo.  Efforts should be made, 
however, to specifically target these regimes. 
 In his 2005 book, Breaking the Real Axis of Evil, Ambassador Palmer advanced several 
practical ways in which the world’s remaining authoritarian regimes could be brought to heel, 
from diplomatic engagement and dialogue, to targeted “smart sanctions” against the regime and 
its main domestic players.147  Many of these strategies are already in place and working to 
varying degrees, from attempts at engagement with regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe, to targeted 
sanctions against the reclusive and brutal regimes in Burma and North Korea.  It may also be 
possible to take international action in the form of a convention, in essence mirroring what a 
convention on a right to democracy would contain, i.e., it would legally prohibit certain types of 
regimes under international law.148  The legal grounding of this convention would rest on the 
same grounds as the convention on a right to democracy – the fact that international law 
currently protects all those rights that constitute a democratic system of governance.  It would, 
however, have the added benefit of describing precisely those types of regimes that should no 
longer be countenanced in the international order.  This type of definitive action may well be 
unlikely, especially given the substantial presence of authoritarian regimes within key sectors of 
the United Nations and other regional bodies, but the United States should, nevertheless, keep 
pressure on the worst abusers, whether through sanctions or other stick-and-carrot approaches, as 
a complement to its more purely constructive democracy promotion efforts.  Positively 
promoting democracy while simultaneously condemning and chastising the abusive actions of 
these regimes cannot help but increase the chances of democratic successes. 
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 A specific convention may also aid in the eventual prosecution and punishment of those 
authoritarian rulers that have held onto power despite the progress towards global democracy in 
the last decades.  The notion of bringing these types of dictators and authoritarian rulers to 
justice has taken a significant hit in the wake of the Iraq war, but it should not be forgotten nor 
swept under the rug.  In the past three decades, several prominent former presidents and political 
leaders have been tried for their crimes while in office, and there is no sound reason why the 
international community should not continue to seek justice in the international sphere.  
Moreover, the ADVANCE Act specifically provides the president with the power and authority 
to institute investigations of various international crimes, and to take appropriate action if an 
individual is found to have committed such violations.149  As stated previously, this provision is 
operative, although no investigations have been completed as of this writing.  Nonetheless, in the 
hands of a willing president, this provision provides broad power to ensure that violators of 
human rights and humanitarian norms will be brought to justice, either in domestic or in 
international forums. 
D.  Broader Cooperation Amongst Democracies on Behalf of Democratic Ideals 
 The new administration should also capitalize on the global popularity of President 
Obama by pressing for closer cooperation amongst our democratic allies on issues pertaining to 
democracy promotion and human rights.  This cooperation could take several forms, from more 
active participation and use of the Community of Democracies, to the establishment of a global 
forum where democratic governance is a precondition to sitting at the table.150  On the other 
hand, institutionalized cooperation via a “club” or “league” of democracies is not necessary, and 
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might not even be an efficacious way in which to pursue these issues.151  Even without such an 
institutional forum for presenting and debating these issues, the U.S. can proceed with closer 
cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally, through traditional diplomatic channels, or act through 
existing international and regional institutions which have shown a dedication to democratic 
ideals, such as the Organization of American States.152  Such an approach has the obvious benefit 
of bringing additional resources and minds to bear on the issue, while providing necessary cover 
for allegations that democracy promotion is a distinctly American pursuit hiding darker and 
ulterior motives.153 
 Nonetheless, the United States should also seek to lift the status of the Community of 
Democracies and to work through that organization on democracy promotion issues.  One of the 
simplest ways to lift the status of the organization, and one that would almost certainly appeal to 
the Obama administration, would be through a summit-level meeting of the Community’s 
member states.  This would provide the first ever high-level meeting between the world’s 
democracies, and might provide the impetus necessary to push the organization towards global 
relevance.  Although the Community has made great strides in recent years, including the 
establishment of a permanent secretariat, it is chronically underfunded, understaffed, and 
underutilized.  A vibrant and engaged Community of Democracies is vitally important for the 
advancement of the democracy promotion project, as it provides an institutional counterweight to 
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the often intransigent United Nations.  The United Nations too often is held in the sway of 
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, blocking the needed disbursement of funds and recourse 
to action necessary to advance the causes of human rights and democracy.  So long as the 
necessary reforms have not been undertaken at the United Nations,154 the Community of 
Democracies can and should serve as a free forum in which to debate democracy issues, while 
also advancing that cause through concrete steps and actions. 
E.  Targeted Development and Institutional Assistance 
 Finally, the United States should utilize its vast expenditures of foreign assistance dollars 
to create an environment ripe for democratic change.  In recent years, much has been written 
about the interplay of democratic and economic development.155  Although it remains somewhat 
unclear what this relationship actually is, whether democratic gains contribute to economic 
development, or economic development promotes democratic reforms, at bottom there is likely 
to be a symbiotic relationship between economic and political development, with each advance 
in one igniting necessary reform in the other.  This being the case, foreign assistance should be 
targeted at institutions lying at the cross-roads of economic and political development.  
Institution and capacity building initiatives are key, as are rule-of-law projects and infrastructure 
development.  As societies open up, economies should develop which should lead to further 
societal openings.156  In this sense, the United States can provide the conditions for democratic 
development while remaining largely aloof from the actual development within the state.157 
                                               
154
 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons From the International 
Economic Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185 (1997/1998); Idem, How to Reform the UN 
System? Constitutionalism, International Law, and International Organizations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 421 (1997). 
155
 See, e.g., Ronald Inglehart & Christian Welzel, How Development Leads to Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
April 2009, at 33. 
156
 Cf. Peter D. Sutherland, Transforming Nations: How the WTO Boosts Economies and Opens Societies, FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar.-April 2008, at 125; Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, The Myth of the Authoritarian Model, 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 68. 
157
 See Mandelbaum, supra note 13. 
52 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Democracy promotion will remain a hot-button issue in foreign policy circles for the 
foreseeable future, but the fact that such efforts may be controversial should not lead to their 
abandonment.  In fact, such efforts should be adopted and vigorously pressed by the Obama 
administration through the baseline established by the ADVANCE Act.  Such an effort would be 
commensurate with much of the new administration’s campaign rhetoric, which itself mirrored 
the eloquent defense of democracy promotion given by former Under Secretary Dobriansky in 
2005: 
We believe the expansion of ordered liberty to be the most effective long-term 
deterrent to the security threats posed by religious extremism, instability, tyranny, 
and terrorism.  Besides being in our national interest, promoting human rights and 
democratic institutions is also consistent with our national ideals and international 
agreements.  The American tradition and universal human rights standards both 
recognize the intrinsic and inalienable dignity of the human person, and the rights 
and freedoms that stem from that dignity.  It is the responsibility of governments 
to respect and secure those rights for their citizens.  And it is the responsibility of 
democracies to promote the protection of these rights and freedoms wherever they 
may be threatened or violated.158 
 
Although there may be no ready-made formula of democracy promotion for all those areas that 
need such assistance, the ADVANCE Act provides a strategic approach to bettering the domestic 
governance for countless millions of people.  Through cooperation and dialogue with those most 
affected by continuing forms of authoritarianism, the United States can and should develop 
action plans to ensure the global growth of freedom.  This task has been begun, yet “as long as 
injustice, oppression and tyranny continue, [the United States’] work is not done.”159  
Nonetheless, it can be hoped that the Obama administration will continue this fight with all the 
tools at its disposal. 
                                               
158
 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula 
Dobriansky). 
159
 Id. at. 15. 
